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Abstract. This paper examines social learning when only one of the two types of decisions is
observable. Because agents arrive randomly over time, and only those who invest are observed,
later agents face a more complicated inference problem than in the standard model, as the absence
of investment might reﬂect either a choice not to invest, or a lack of arrivals. We show that, as
in the standard model, learning is complete if and only if signals are unbounded. If signals are
bounded, cascades may occur, and whether they are more or less likely than in the standard model
depends on a property of the signal distribution. If the hazard ratio of the distributions increases
in the signal, it is more likely that no one invests in the standard model than in this one, and
welfare is higher. Conclusions are reversed if the hazard ratio is decreasing. The monotonicity
of the hazard ratio is the condition that guarantees the presence or absence of informational
cascades in the standard herding model.
Keywords: Informational herds, Cascades, Selection bias.
JEL codes: D82, D83
1. Introduction
The process of learning in social contexts confronts the same diﬃculties as any other statistical
analysis. The data available to an individual may be subject to selection bias. Consider the
leading example used by Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] (henceforth BHW), for instance.
Upon learning that a paper has been previously rejected, a referee at a second journal tilts toward
rejection. But what if, as is usually the case, he did not learn about this rejection? Surely,
he would nevertheless wonder about the paper’s journey onto his desk, and speculate about
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rejections the paper might have gone through. While publications are by deﬁnition observable,
rejections are not.
To wit, there are far more signiﬁcant instances of such bias in academia. How easy is it to
publish a paper that ﬁnds inconclusive empirical evidence? In medical and social sciences, studies
whose ﬁndings are statistically insigniﬁcant get ﬁled away, biasing the published papers toward
positive results.
1
The diﬃculty in interpreting the absence of negatives is encountered everywhere. Is no one
waiting in this line because cabs come by all the time, or because this isn’t actually a cab line?
Do the low ﬁgures of tax evasion reﬂect the success of deterrent policies, or the success of tax
evaders? Why do 90% of mutual funds truthfully claim to have performance in the ﬁrst quartile
of their peers? (The other three quarters of funds have closed. See Elton, Gruber and Blake [7].)
This paper develops a model of biased social learning and revisits the ﬁndings of the literature.
In this model, individuals arrive randomly over time. As in Smith and Sørensen [13], each agent
has some private, conditionally independent information about the relevance of taking some
decision immediately upon arrival—say, making an investment. As often in the social learning
literature, we assume that the payoﬀ from investing depends on the state of the world, but not
on what earlier or later individuals decide. Therefore, values are common, and externalities are
purely informational.
2 As is standard as well, signal distributions satisfy the strict monotone
likelihood ration property (MLRP).
What sets this model apart from standard models is the following informational assumption.
While the decision to invest (but not the payoﬀ from investing) is observable to all future in-
dividuals, the failure to do so, and in fact, the mere arrival of individuals (who do not invest),
remains hidden. Individuals arriving later will observe “positives” (if and when earlier individuals
invested), but not “negatives” (if and when earlier individuals chose to abstain).
1This phenomenon is known as the “ﬁle-drawer problem,” or the “publication bias.” See Scargle [11]. As a result,
prominent medical journals no longer publish results of drug research sponsored by pharmaceutical companies
unless that research was registered in a public database from the start. Some of them also encourage publication
of study protocols in their journal.
2We shall also discuss at length a version in which there is only one investment opportunity, in which case
there is an obvious payoﬀ externality.Biased Social Learning 3
Therefore, every individual faces a complex problem of statistical inference: given the observed
history, and the randomness in the arrival of individuals, how likely is it that some individuals
had the opportunity to invest, but chose not to? And if so, what were their private signals?
Note that, in this problem, time plays a key role, as it becomes increasingly more likely, as time
passes by, that some individuals must have had the opportunity to invest.
In this context, we ask whether biased social learning exacerbates or mitigates herding. Could
it be the case that some investment opportunities, or lucrative projects, remain unexploited
because agents considering making it suspect that others must have thought of it, or even tried
it before them? How many entrepreneurs, or scientists, stumbling across a new idea, chose not
to follow through this idea because of the rational belief that they were unlikely to be the ﬁrst
to think of it?
Our ﬁrst main result shows that, qualitatively, the absence of negatives does not alter the con-
ditions under which cascades can, or cannot occur. If the informativeness of signals is bounded,
wrong herds can occur (that is, they will occur for some prior and payoﬀ parameters). On the
other hand, if signals are unbounded, learning is necessarily complete; whether the state of the
world is such that investment is proﬁtable or not, agents will eventually learn it.
On the other hand, our second main result shows how, quantitatively, the absence of negatives
aﬀects the probability of a wrong herd. Consider the case of bounded signals (so that cascades
may occur). What is the probability that no agent ever invests, while agents should, in the case
of biased learning, relative to this probability in the benchmark model of BHW, in which all
decisions, to invest or not, are observed? As it turns out, the comparison of these probabilities
hinges upon a simple statistical property of the signal distribution. If signals satisfy the increasing
hazard ratio property (IHRP), that is, if the ratio of the hazard rates increases in the signal,
then the probability of no one ever investing is lower under biased learning, independently of
the state of the world. Conversely, if the hazard ratio is decreasing, then this probability is
lower in the benchmark model. While already used in the statistical literature, IHRP appears
to be new in the literature on social learning. Yet as we show, it also plays a key role in the
BHW model. Namely, IHRP is the necessary and suﬃcient condition under for the absence of
informational cascades, namely provided the decision of the ﬁrst individual depends on his signal,
the decision of all later individuals will do as well. That is, it ensures that the posterior publicBiased Social Learning 4
belief necessarily stays in the learning region provided that the prior lies in it.
3 While biased
learning always leads to higher investment (relative to the benchmark model) under IHRP, it
nevertheless leads to lower welfare, at least in the version of our model in which there is only
one investment opportunity.
4
In practice, biased learning comes in at least two kinds. It can be, as we have assumed so far,
that the absence of negatives indicates that no agent had an opportunity to invest, rather than
a choice not to invest. Alternatively, it may be that only successful investments are observed,
while failed investments, no investments, and no opportunity to invest are all observationally
indistinguishable. In this second variant, if investments may also succeed, albeit at a lower rate,
in the unfavorable state, the resulting inferential problem remains non-trivial. In a last section,
we show that the qualitative ﬁndings (i.e., our ﬁrst result) extend to this environment as well.
The ﬁrst models of sequential decisions and observational learning by Banerjee [1] and Bickchan-
dani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2], and their subsequent generalization by Smith and Sørensen [13]
all assume that all actions are observed by later individuals. Namely, agents could observe the
precise sequence of decisions made by all the predecessors. Later work, notably Çelen and Kariv
[4], Callander and Hörner [3] and Smith and Sørensen [12] relaxes this assumption and considers
the case in which either a subsample of the sequence, or a statistic thereof is observable. As these
authors show, the asymptotic properties of social learning may radically change. For instance,
Çelen and Kariv [4] show that, when agents only observe the action of their immediate prede-
cessor, beliefs do not converge. Therefore, complete learning never occurs, as beliefs and actions
end up cycling. Hence, limiting the information available to agents may alter the qualitative
properties of learning in general, although it turns out not to do so in the case of biased learning.
Callander and Hörner [3] show that if agents can only observe the fraction of agents having taken
each action, rather than the entire sequence, then it might be optimal to take the action that
was adopted by the minority of predecessors. A similar observational assumption is made in
Hendricks, Sorensen and Wiseman [8].
Chari and Kehoe [6] develop an observational learning model with a similar investment bias,
in the sense that more information is revealed after observing an investment than after observing
3More precisely, IHRP guarantees that this is the case after “good news,” that is, after an observed investment
decision. There is a corresponding property for the case of “bad news.”
4This version allows us to focus on the history of no observed investment.Biased Social Learning 5
a decision not to investment. Each investment amount is an observable continuous variable, so
the investor’s private signal can be fully inferred (when this investment amount is positive). As
in usual models, in case of a non-investment is observed then only a truncation on the investor’s
private signal can be inferred. In a sense, their model adds information in a biased fashion to the
standard model (investment decisions become more informative), while we suppress information
in a biased fashion, by assuming that decisions not to invest are not observable.
Our model is also related to models of endogenous timing such as the elegant paper of Chamley
and Gale [5]. In their model as in ours, whether an agent has an opportunity to invest or not is a
random variable. In their model, there is a ﬁnite number of agents who are all present from the
start, and may choose to wait before investing, if they wish to. Ineﬃciently low investment occurs
because agents might decide to wait, in the hope that others will act ﬁrst, and thereby reveal
valuable information. In our model, agents arrive at random times, and the total number of
agents having the opportunity to invest is almost surely countably inﬁnite, so that the collective
information of the agents reveals the state. In both their model and ours, agents must be careful
in interpreting an observed absence of investment. In Chamley and Gale [5], this absence might
also reﬂect strategic delay, rather than bad news, while in ours, it might simply be because no
agent happened to face this choice. As we show, in the version of our model in which the game
stops after the ﬁrst investment opportunity, agents have no incentive to engage in strategic delay.
Section 2 introduces the set-up. Section 3 develops the analysis and parametric examples. The
qualitative results are stated in Section 4. Section 5 focuses on the quantitative results regarding
the probability that no one ever invests. Section 6 discusses the variant in which only successful
investments are observed. Most proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2. Set-up
2.1. Information. Imagine a situation in which there are two states of the world. The state of
the world is denoted θ ∈ {0,1}. We refer to state 0 as the bad state, and to state 1 as the good
state. The ex ante probability of the good state is denoted
p0 := P[θ = 1] ∈ (0,1).
There is a countable inﬁnity of agents (or individuals, or players). Each agent receives a
private signal (or type) x ∈ X := [0,1]. Private signals are conditionally independent acrossBiased Social Learning 6
agents. The conditional distribution of this signal is identical across agents. Conditional on
state θ, the distribution (c.d.f) is denoted Fθ, and assumed twice diﬀerentiable on (0,1), with
density fθ that is strictly positive on (0,1).
Private signals provide valuable information about the state to the agents. The distribu-
tions are assumed throughout to satisfy the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP






on the interval (0,1), we assume that l is strictly increasing. This guarantees that higher values
of the signal lead to higher posterior probabilities that the state is good, for all priors. See
Milgrom [9]. In some instances, without loss of generality, we will set l(1/2) to 1, so that the
signal x = 1/2 leaves any given prior probability belief unchanged.
2.2. Actions and Payoﬀs. Each agent i faces a binary choice. He may either invest or not.
The decision to invest is denoted I, while the decision not to is denoted N. An action, therefore,
is an element ai ∈ {N,I}. Investing is costly: the action I entails a cost c ∈ (0,1). The return
from investment is random, and depends on the state of the world. We normalize its expectation
to 0 in the bad state, and to 1 in the good state. The payoﬀ from not investing is set to 0, so
that, under complete information, an agent would invest if and only if the state were good. To
summarize, the payoﬀ of an agent is given by
u(N) := 0,
u(I) := −c +
(
0 if θ = 0,
1 if θ = 1.
Note that it is optimal for an agent to invest if and only if he assigns a probability of at least c
to the good state. Throughout, we refer to this probability as the agent’s belief.
2.3. Timing and Histories. We are now ready to describe the extensive-form game. Time is
continuous and the horizon is inﬁnite. There is Poisson arrival process deﬁned over dates t ∈ R+,
with associated random point process {Ti}i≥0, with T0 := 0, and Ti ≤ Ti+1 for all i ≥ 0. The
intensity of the Poisson process, λ, is constant and independent of the state of the world.Biased Social Learning 7
The random variable Ti determines agent i’s arrival time. That is, agent i must take an
action j at the date of the realization ti of Ti. Because agents cannot delay their decision, any
discounting is irrelevant and ignored.
Arrival times are not observed, and neither are decisions not to invest. Private signals are
not observed either. Further, agents do not know their index, i.e. agent i does not know that,
by deﬁnition of his index, i − 1 agents had the opportunity to invest before him.5 However,
decisions to invest are observed (of course, the corresponding arrival time is then inferred). A
(complete) history up to date t, then, speciﬁes the state of the world, the inﬁnite sequence of
private signals of players, the date t and the sequence {(ti,ai)}i, with ti ≤ t, for all i, of arrival
times and actions taken by the corresponding agent. This sequence is (almost surely) ﬁnite.
Agents, however, only observe a subset of these arrival times. The relevant history, then, is the
public history ht := (t,{(ti,I)}i), which is the subset of the complete history that includes all
times at which an agent decided to invest, as well as the current date t. Note that the public
history does not include the identity i of the agents that decided to invest, so that it is not
possible to infer from such a history how many agents actually had the opportunity to invest up
to time t. Denote the set of public histories up to time t by Ht, and let H := ∪t≥0Ht denote the
set of all histories. Set H0 := (0,{∅}). A history ht = (t,{∅}) indicates that no investment has
taken place up to date t.
2.4. Strategies and Equilibrium. A strategy for agent i speciﬁes, for each possible signal x,
arrival time ti and public history ht, t = ti, an action choice (possibly mixed). That is, a behavior
strategy for agent i is a measurable mapping
σi : X × H → △{N,I},
where △{N,I} denotes the set of lotteries over {N,I}. Since a player only knows his own
type, this is a game of incomplete information, and one should therefore specify each player’s
assessment over the complete history, for each possible (xi,ht), t = ti. Given that agents cannot
delay their decision, and given the payoﬀ speciﬁcation, it is clear that the only relevant probability
that aﬀects their choice is their belief pi over the state of the world, given (x,ht). We build this
directly in the deﬁnition of an equilibrium.
5Their belief about their rank is the improper uniform prior, so that they are a priori equally likely to be
anywhere in the sequence.Biased Social Learning 8
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of a strategy proﬁle σ := {σi}i and a proﬁle of beliefs
pi : X ×H → [0,1], all i, such that (i) each player’s strategy is a best-reply at every information
set, and (ii) the beliefs pi are consistent with Bayes’ rule at every information set that is reached
with positive probability, given σ.
Note that, given MLRP, the optimal strategy of an agent must be a pure strategy, and more
precisely a cut-oﬀ strategy. That is, he should invest if and only if his signal is high enough. We
focus on symmetric equilibria. This implies that an equilibrium will be uniquely determined by
a measurable function xt that speciﬁes the cut-oﬀ type above which an agent i invests at time t.
Along with the prior belief p0, this determines, in particular, the public belief pt := P[θ = 1|ht]
(henceforth, belief) about the state given the observed history ht. Note also that pt is a summary









Because L is strictly increasing in p, we shall sometimes, with an abuse of terminology, refer to
this ratio as the public belief as well.
3. Analysis
3.1. Threshold Signal and Public Belief. As mentioned, an equilibrium can be summarized
by two functions of the public history ht: the belief pt that the state is good, and the cut-oﬀ xt
such that an agent invests at date t if and only if his signal exceeds xt.
Bayes’ rule provides one relationship between xt and the belief pt. Namely, pt determines xt
since, given pt, an agent of type xt must be indiﬀerent between investing or not, at least when
xt is in (0,1):6
xt := x solves E[θ|x,ht] = P[θ = 1|x,ht] = c.
Using Bayes’ rule, this means that the threshold xt solves
f1 (x)pt
f1 (x)pt + f0 (x)(1 − pt)
= c.
6If, given pt, it is optimal to invest independently of the signal, set xt equal to 0. Similarly, set it to 1 if it is
always optimal not to invest.Biased Social Learning 9
Using the likelihood ratio, the relationship between the threshold x and the public belief L takes





which highlights the inverse relationship between the public belief and the signal cut-oﬀ: if agents
are more optimistic, that is, if the public belief L is higher, a lower threshold signal x is required
for an investment opportunity to be deemed proﬁtable.
There is a second relationship between xt and pt. Namely, the threshold xt determines the
evolution of the belief pt, along with the initial value p0. The evolution of pt over some small
interval of time (t,t + dt], dt > 0, depends on whether an investment occurs or not during that
interval. Accordingly, we divide the analysis into two cases.
3.2. Evolution without Investment. Consider ﬁrst the case in which there has been no invest-
ment up to time t. Note that, in this case, pt is a continuous function, because the distribution
over arrival times is continuous. It follows that xt is continuous as well. Let
Gθ,t := P[ht = (t,{∅})|θ]
be the probability of this event, conditional on state θ. Since investments arrive at rate λFθ(xt),





To see this, note that, from time t to time t + dt, this probability evolves as follows (neglecting
terms of order dt2 or higher):
Gθ,t+dt = Gθ,t   (Fθ (xt)   λdt + 1   (1 − λdt)).
Indeed, the probability that no one invests up to time t+dt is the probability that no one invests
up to time t, multiplied by the probability that no one invests in the time interval (t,t+dt]. This
latter probability is the sum of two terms. With probability 1 − λdt, no agent arrives during
this time interval. With probability Fθ (xt) λdt, some agent arrives in the time interval, but his





= −λ(1 − Fθ (xt)),
along with Gθ,0 = 1. This integrates out to the formula above.Biased Social Learning 10
After a no-investment history ht = (t,{∅}), the public belief evolves according to
pt = P[θ = 1|ht] =






Since G1,t is a function of (xs)s≤t, this provides a second relationship between the belief pt and
the threshold xt.
We now combine the two relationships. As pointed out, the threshold xt solves
f1 (x)pt
f1 (x)pt + f0 (x)(1 − pt)
=
f1 (x)G1,tp0
f1 (x)G1,tp0 + f0 (x)G0,t (1 − p0)
= c.







it follows that xt solves







Since the right-hand side is diﬀerentiable in t, and l is diﬀerentiable, the function xt must be




= λ(F0 (xt) − F1 (xt)),
with initial condition x0 = l−1 (γ). Integrating, we obtain the following implicit characterization
of the threshold xt:







(F0 (x) − F1 (x))
−1 dx.
While the right-hand side admits no closed-form solution in general, we shall provide a few
examples in which we can solve for xt explicitly. Note that this also gives us a characterization







While we have focused so far on the history in which there is no investment at all, observe that
the same analysis applies to the evolution of the belief for arbitrary histories, over any interval of
time over which no investment takes place, provided the initial condition is accordingly modiﬁed.
If s is the last date at which an investment is observed, and the belief immediately after this
investment is ps, we simply replace p0 by ps in the deﬁnition of γ.Biased Social Learning 11
Finally, observe that a simple change of variables yields
Z t
0
(1 − Fθ (xs))ds =
Z xt
x0






l′ (x)(1 − Fθ (x))
l(x)(F0 (x) − F1 (x))
dx.







3.3. Evolution after an Investment. If an investment occurs at date t, the evolution of the
belief is discontinuous at date t. The belief pt jumps up, since agents become suddenly more
optimistic (by MLRP). Simultaneously, the threshold xt jumps down. More precisely, let (Lt,xt)













1 − F1 (xt)
1 − F0 (xt)
Lt > Lt.













Taken together, the formulas derived in the last two subsections allow us to solve recursively for
the threshold xt after any arbitrary history ht.
3.4. Examples. We provide here a pair of parametric examples. Consider ﬁrst the case in which








for some a > 0. Note that the range of the likelihood ratio is l(x) ∈ [e−a,ea]. The parameter a
is a measure of the informativeness of the private signals, as a larger a implies a larger range of
possible likelihood ratio values.
For the initial condition γ = 1 (which obtains, for instance, for p0 = 1/2 and c = 1/2), the























￿2.Biased Social Learning 12
The details are in the appendix. As discussed, if an investment takes place at some date, both
the public belief and the threshold jump. The evolution of the cut-oﬀ and the public belief is
shown below for the case in which λ = a = 1, and an investment takes place at date t = 5.










Since the limit of this probability as t → ∞ is bounded away from zero, there is a positive
probability that no one ever invests, although the state is good. This probability decreases as
the informativeness of the signals a increases.











Figure 1. Cut-oﬀ (left) and belief (right) over time with an investment at t = 5.
As a second example, take the power distributions given by, for all x ∈ [0,1],
F1 = x
2, F0 = 1 − (1 − x)
2 .







which tends to 0 as t → ∞, because, along such a history, the cut-oﬀ xt tends to one. Here
as well, details can be found in the appendix. This means that, in this example, almost surely,
investments will eventually take place when the state is good. Since this is true for the ﬁrst
investment, it is also true for later investments, so that the total number of investments is
unbounded.Biased Social Learning 13
As is easy to check, the likelihood ratio of the signal distribution is a bounded function in
the ﬁrst example, while it is not in the second. We shall prove in the next section that this
distinction explains the diﬀerent asymptotic properties of these two examples.
4. Asymptotic Properties
Although the learning process is biased, its asymptotic properties are the same as in tradi-
tional models of social learning. As is standard, we deﬁne private signals to be unbounded if
limx→0 l(x) = 0 and limx→1l(x) = ∞. This means that extreme signals are arbitrarily informa-
tive. Signals are bounded if the ﬁrst limit is strictly positive, and the second is ﬁnite. Note that
this does not partition the set of all distributions (for instance, it could be that f1(0) is equal to
zero, but f0(1) is not).
From equation (1), it follows that an agent with the highest possible private signal, signal
x = 1, will be indiﬀerent between investing or not (if ever) if l(1)Lt = c/(1 − c), where Lt is the
likelihood ratio of the public belief resulting from the public history up to date t. Let L denote
the highest likelihood ratio for which, given that the public history leads to this likelihood ratio,
it is optimal for such an agent not to invest (with the convention that L = 0 if he always does).










Similarly, deﬁne L to be the lowest likelihood ratio for which an agent with the lowest possible



















the probabilities p,p are in (0,1) if signals are bounded, and in {0,1} if they are unbounded.
If signals are unbounded, then, independently of the history up to t, an agent arriving at date
t will follow his signal if this signal is extreme enough. While it is not hard to see how this
implies complete learning if the state is good, this is only slightly subtler if the state is bad:
although later agents do not observe the informative actions of the agents with suﬃciently lowBiased Social Learning 14
signals, they will infer as much from their absence over the long-run. We see here the key role of
two assumptions: the arrival rate is common knowledge (so that the absence of negatives can be
correctly interpreted), and there is only one action that is hidden (so that agents can infer it from
its absence). When signals are bounded, cascades can happen, just as in the traditional model,
and for the same reason: histories leading to a belief above p, or to the belief p have positive
probability under either state.7 In both cases, eventually, almost all agents take the same action.
This discussion is summarized in the following set of results.
Proposition 1. Beliefs converge a.s., with limit
p∞ := lim
t
pt ∈ {p} ∪ [p,1].




Proof. See Appendix. ￿
This does not yet say that beliefs converge to the correct value if signals are unbounded, but
simply that they converge to either 0 or 1. Turning to investments, we have the following.
Proposition 2. If signals are unbounded, the probability that there is no investment ever in the
good state is zero. It is positive if they are bounded.
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
If the number of investments is ﬁnite, then, after the last investment, the public belief would
decrease to the lower bound p. On the other hand, if there was an inﬁnite number of investments,
the belief cannot converge to the lower bound p, because, after each investment, the public belief
must exceed the cost c. Hence, in that case, beliefs must converge to (no less than) the upper
bound p. This is summed up in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The total number of investments is ﬁnite (resp., inﬁnite) if and only if the belief
converges to p (resp., greater than or equal to p).
7The asymmetry is due to the fact that, in case of an investment, the posterior belief might jump above p, but
in case of no investment, the belief trajectory is continuous.Biased Social Learning 15
As expected, complete learning occurs if and only if signals are unbounded.
Proposition 4. The belief converges to the correct value almost surely if and only if signals are
unbounded.
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
Together with Proposition 1, this means that, if signals are unbounded, the number of invest-
ments is a.s. inﬁnite in the good state, and ﬁnite in the bad state.
5. One-Investment Game
In both the traditional, BHW model, and in this model, learning is complete when signals are
unbounded. Therefore, we turn our attention to the case of bounded signals. To compare the
likelihood of cascades under biased learning, relative to traditional learning, one should compare,
in particular, the probability that there is a total of exactly k investments over the inﬁnite horizon
under both scenarios, for all integers k. While it might be possible to do so, we shall make a
simpler comparison, by focusing on the probability that at least one investment is ever made.
We may, and will interpret this as a game in which there is a single investment opportunity;
obviously, this interpretation does not aﬀect the agents’ behavior, since agents cannot choose
the timing of their decision. In fact, assuming that agents cannot wait before taking their action
is not restrictive. If other agents do not delay either, an agent cannot gain by waiting: either
nothing happens, or the game ends. This result does not require agents to discount future payoﬀs.
More formally,
Proposition 5. If all other agents follow the cut-oﬀ strategy xt described in Section 3, delaying
investment is not optimal, for any discount rate.8
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
Observe that this version of the game admits independent economic interpretations, in which
the winner takes all. It is of no use to discover a product that has been already patented, or to
prove a result that has been already published.
8While it seems plausible that acting immediately is also the unique equilibrium strategy in this game, ad-
dressing this question would require deﬁning the continuous-time game which is beyond the scope of this paper.Biased Social Learning 16
5.1. The BHW Model. The BHW model diﬀers from ours in two respects: all actions are
observed, and arrivals are not random. But given that actions are observed, whether arrivals are
random or not is irrelevant to the decisions of the agents, and we might, for concreteness, keep
on viewing arrivals as random. The public history up to date t is summarized by the sequence
of individuals who arrived up this to date, and what their decisions where. Because we are
assuming here that a single investment ends the game, this further reduces to the number n of
agents who arrived and chose not to invest. Between each arrival, the threshold that characterizes
the optimal strategy is now constant. Let xk denote this cut-oﬀ when there have been k decisions
not to invest so far.
Therefore, the probability that no agent invests, among the ﬁrst n agents, conditional on the





The thresholds xk can then be solved recursively. Clearly, x0 = l−1(γ), and, from Bayes’ rule,





since the right-hand side is the likelihood ratio of an agent with private signal xn, given the



















While those two expressions bear little in common, we shall see that the comparison hinges upon
a simple statistical property that we deﬁne next.Biased Social Learning 17
5.2. The Increasing Hazard Ratio Property (IHRP). By the strict monotone likelihood
ratio property, the mapping x  → (c/(1 − c))/l(x) is strictly decreasing, mapping (0,1) onto
(L,L). Deﬁne the hazard ratio at the signal x as the ratio of the hazard rates conditional on the
good and the bad state, that is,
H (x) :=
1 − F0 (x)
1 − F1 (x)
l(x).
The (strict) increasing hazard ratio property (IHRP) holds if this mapping is strictly increasing.
This property has been introduced in the statistical literature by Kalashnikov and Rachev (1986).
Both parametric examples of Section 3.4. satisfy IHRP.
The relevance of IHRP for the BHW model is almost immediate. Because the posterior
likelihood ratio after an investment is given by
1 − F1 (x)
1 − F0 (x)
L,
where x is the cut-oﬀ signal and L is the prior likelihood ratio, and because the cut-oﬀ signal solves
L = (c/(1 − c))/l(x), it follows that this posterior likelihood ratio is equal to (c/(1 − c))/H (x).
To put it diﬀerently, IHRP states that this posterior likelihood ratio is decreasing in the cut-oﬀ
signal, or alternatively, since the cut-oﬀ signal is decreasing in the prior likelihood ratio L (under
MLRP), that the posterior likelihood ratio L+ is increasing in the prior likelihood ratio L (after
an investment).
To be a little more formal, let L+ : R+ → R+ denote this function mapping the prior likelihood
ratio into the posterior likelihood ratio, and let us say that the signals satisfy updating mono-
tonicity after good news (UMG) if L+ is strictly increasing. Given our discussion, the following
is immediate.
Proposition 6. Under MLRP, IHRP is necessary and suﬃcient for UMG.
A corresponding property can be deﬁned for the event in which an agent does not invest. Deﬁne
the function K by K(x) = F0 (x)l(x)/F1 (x) for all x ∈ (0,1). The (strict) increasing failure
ratio property (IFRP) holds if this mapping is strictly increasing. Both parametric examples of
Section 3.4. satisfy IFRP. Observe that the posterior likelihood ratio, conditional on such an
event, is given by
(c/(1 − c))
K (x)
,Biased Social Learning 18
where x is a decreasing function of the prior likelihood ratio. It follows that this posterior
likelihood ratio, L−, is an increasing function of the prior likelihood ratio L. That is, let us say
that the signals satisfy updating monotonicity after bad news (UMB) if L− is strictly increasing.
Then it immediately follows that, under MLRP, IFRP is necessary and suﬃcient for UMB.
As it turns out, these concepts play an important role for the existence of cascades. If the




, as deﬁned previously, an agent’s strategy will depend on
his private signal: he will invest if and only if his signal is above some cut-oﬀ in (0,1). (Recall that









is a proper subset of (0,1).) On the other hand, if this ratio ever exits the interval (L,L)
a cascade starts and observational learning stops: all agents take the same action independently
of their signal.
Observe now that, by deﬁnition of L, and of the mapping L+, L is a ﬁxed-point of this
mapping as:
1−F1(0)
1−F0(0)L = L. Similarly, L is a ﬁxed-point of the mapping L−. Therefore, updating
monotonicity after good news guarantees that, if the prior likelihood ratio start below L, the
posterior remains below it. Similarly, UMB guarantees that the posterior likelihood ratio is above
L if the prior is.
As a result, along with MLRP, IHRP (and IFRP) is a suﬃcient condition guaranteeing that,
provided that the ﬁrst agent uses a strategy that depends on his private signal, then all later
agents will: if the game does not start with a cascade, a cascade will never occur. Conversely,
it is a necessary condition, in the sense that, if either condition is violated, it is possible to ﬁnd
parameters p0 and c for which a cascade occurs with positive probability.
That IHRP (and IFRP) are the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for (the absence of) cascades
appears to be new. The early literature (for instance, BHW) established that cascades occur
when signals are discrete, while later contributions (in particular, Smith and Sørensen, 2001)
showed that this result does not necessarily hold with continuous signals. Indeed, it is easy to
see that IHRP and IFRP are necessarily violated in the case of discrete signals.9 On the other
9The deﬁnition above assumes a continuous density. In the discrete case, the function H must be deﬁned by

















which is decreasing at every boundary point L =
P1[xk]
P0[xk].Biased Social Learning 19
hand, unbounded signals (more precisely, f1(0) = 0) is stronger than (local) IHRP, in the sense
that it implies L = ∞, so that clearly L+ has to be increasing for high enough likelihood ratios.
To get some intuition for these results, recall that H (x) is the ratio of the hazard rate
h1 (x)/h0 (x), where
hθ (x) :=
fθ (x)
1 − Fθ (x)
is the hazard rate in state θ, namely the density at the cut-oﬀ x, conditional on an investment. If
the public belief increases, the threshold x decreases, and therefore, according to IHRP, so does
H(x). That is, as the public belief increases, and conditional on an investment, it becomes less
likely that the investor was least optimistic (among agents who would invest), in the good state
relative to the bad state. To see why this is consistent with updating monotonicity, suppose that
it were the case that, to the contrary, the least optimistic investor was conditionally more likely in
the good state than in the bad state. Because of MLRP, an investment would still be good news,
but, since higher signals are better news, this would mitigate the good news. The likelihood ratio
might not increase much for higher values of L, and this might violate the monotonicity of the
mapping L+.
While it is not clear a priori whether it is more reasonable to assume that the hazard ratio is
increasing or decreasing, note that, in case it is decreasing, the failure of updating monotonicity
implies that a single decision to invest will trigger an investment cascade. That is, the dichotomy
is rather extreme: if the ﬁrst agent uses a strategy that depends on his signal, all later agents
will do so if the hazard ratio is increasing (assuming IFRP), while a single investment will trigger
a cascade if the hazard ratio is decreasing.10 This can be most easily understood with the help
of the following ﬁgure.
It is worth mentioning that, of course, IHRP neither implies, nor is implied by MLRP. While
MLRP states that higher signals are better news, IHRP states that this remains true, conditional
on truncations i.e. substituting fθ (x) with hθ (x). Therefore, these two stochastic orders are re-
lated, as IHRP implies MLRP if in addition hθ (x) decreases in the state θ. The relationship is
explored at the end of the appendix. Also, because Smith and Sørensen [13] show that mono-
tonicity of the mapping L+ is implied by the assumption that the private belief log-likelihood
10In fact, a decreasing hazard ratio is inconsistent with both bounded signals and MLRP. But it is consistent
with MLRP and signals that are not unbounded, as the example F1(x) = x, F0(x) = x(3 − x2)/2 illustrates.Biased Social Learning 20
ratio is log-concave, while IHRP is necessary and suﬃcient, it follows indirectly that the log-
concavity assumption is stronger than IHRP (and arguably more complicated to verify). On the
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5.3. The Result. We are ﬁnally ready to compare the probabilities of no investment ever in
both models, conditional on a given state. One might suspect that this comparison depends
on the state, but it turns out that this is not the case, because the ratio of these conditional
probabilities is the same in both models, as the next lemma establishes.
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The result follows. ￿
The main result of this section establishes that the probability that no investment ever takes
place is higher in the BHW model than in the biased learning model, if IHRP holds. That is,
under IHRP, biased learning leads to higher investment, independently of the state. If the hazard
ratio is constant, both models lead to the same amount of investment, and biased learning leads
to lower investment if the hazard ratio is decreasing.
Proposition 8. Assume IHRP. Conditional on either state, the probability of investment is
always larger in the hidden action model:
Gθ,∞ < Bθ,∞.
This inequality is reversed if the hazard ratio is decreasing.
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to provide a simple intuition for this result. The proof hinges on
the inequality








which holds under IHRP because it gives us precisely the appropriate lower bound on the in-
tegrand appearing on the right-hand side. This inequality can be interpreted as follows. Start
from the same (initial public belief and hence) initial threshold xk in both models, deﬁne xk+1
as the new threshold after bad news in the BHW model and deﬁne ∆tk as the time it takes for
the threshold to go from xk up to xk+1 in the hidden action model. Whichever the state, the
probability that there is one investment in the biased learning model during the time span ∆tk
is always larger than the probability that the next agent that arrives invests in the BHW model.
That is, the comparison is between what the next agents does in the BHW model and what
none, one, or many agents do if they arrive in the time span ∆tk in the hidden action model.Biased Social Learning 22
5.4. Welfare Comparison. Since the probabilities of cascades are not the same in both models,
it is natural to wonder which one aggregates information better. In the good state, it is optimal
for someone to invest, while in the bad state, it is optimal for all to abstain. Therefore, we deﬁne
welfare by the expectation of the utility of this eventual outcome (either someone eventually
invests, or no one does). Since players do not internalize the informational externalities, there is
no reason to expect a priori that having more information is necessarily better. Indeed, whether
this is the case depends here again on the hazard ratio, as the next result establishes.
Proposition 9. Under IHRP, the welfare in the hidden action model is lower than in the bench-
mark model. It is higher if the hazard ratio is decreasing.
Proof. The welfare in the hidden action model is, by deﬁnition,
W (G) := Eθ [(1 − Gθ)u(I) + (Gθ)u(N)]
= p0 (1 − G1)(1 − c) + (1 − p0)(1 − G0)(−c)
= p0 (1 − c)
￿







= p0 (1 − c)(1 − γ + (l(1) − 1)G1),
and likewise for W (B). Since l(1) > 1, as 1 is the highest signal, this expression is increasing in
G1, and therefore
W (G) < W (B),
whenever the IHRP is satisﬁed. The inequality is obviously reversed if the hazard ratio is
decreasing. ￿
Therefore, even though the model with biased learning performs better in the good state, as
it always leads to a higher probability of investment, it achieves a lower welfare than the BHW
model, at least under IHRP.
5.5. Many Investments. So far, the comparison between the model with biased learning and
the benchmark BHW model has been performed in the game with one investment. Comparing
the two models more generally is diﬃcult. For example, computing the probability of exactly two
investments involves a summation (or, in the biased learning model, an integration) over the times
at which one agent ﬁrst invested. Even in the simple example of an exponential distribution, thatBiased Social Learning 23
satisﬁes IHRP (see Section 3.4.), closed-form solutions appear elusive. Nevertheless, numerical
computations can be performed in this case, which we brieﬂy present here.
Consider ﬁrst the model with biased learning. Let G0
θ (x0,xt) denote the probability of no
investment in state θ during the time interval required for the threshold to go from an initial
value x0 to the value xt, and let Gn
θ (x0,1) denote the probability of exactly n eventual investments
in state θ (i.e., over the time interval required for the threshold to go from the initial value x0 to

















as the probability that there are n investments overall can be decomposed as the sum of the
probabilities, as t varies, that the ﬁrst investment occurs exactly at time t, and that exactly
n − 1 investments overall are made afterwards (given the resulting new initial value).
In the exponential example, considering the state θ = 1 for instance, we obtain
G
0


































This integration can only be performed explicitly in the case n = 1.
A similar decomposition can be used in the BHW model: the probability of k overall invest-
ments is the sum, over the index n of the ﬁrst agent to invest, of the probability that the ﬁrst
agent to invest is the n-th agent, times the probability that there are exactly k − 1 agents in-
vesting in the game (where, for the latter probability, we use as initial belief the public belief
resulting from a ﬁrst investment by the n-th agent.)
These recursions allow numerical computation of these probabilities. Figure 2 below depicts
the (log plot of) the probabilities of k eventual investments in both models, in the exponential
example with parameter a = 1/4 (the same pattern arises for all values of a). These probabilities
cross exactly once. That is, there exists an integer k∗ such that, for k < k∗, the probability of
k eventual investments is higher in the BHW model, while the opposite is true for k ≥ k∗. It
can be numerically veriﬁed that the probability distribution of k or less eventual investments ofBiased Social Learning 24
the BHW model ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the one of the biased learning model. This
























Figure 2. Log plot of the probabilities of k eventual investments for a = 1/4
(dots: BHW benchmark; squares: biased learning model).
6. Payoff Information: One Successful Investment Game
As discussed in the introduction, there are many applications in which not only the opportunity
to invest is hidden, but also decisions to invest that resulted in a failure. To discuss such a
variation, it is necessary to introduce another dimension to the model, namely, we must specify
the probabilities with which, conditional on a given state, a decision to invest is successful. To
simplify, we assume here that the game ends with the ﬁrst successful investment. This adds
another layer to the inferential problem. The absence of an observed success has now three
possible explanations: either no agent had the opportunity to invest, or agents with such an
opportunity chose not to, given their private signal, or they chose to, but failed.
Deﬁne Pθ as the probability that an investment succeeds, conditional on the state θ. Assume
that
0 < P0 < P1 < 1,
so that success is more likely in the good state. Successes are conditionally independent across
agents who invest.
The deﬁnitions of histories and strategies, as well as the derivations are quite similar to those
in the baseline model with biased learning, and we shall omit the details. Let ht = (t,{∅})Biased Social Learning 25
denote a history without successful investment up to date t, and
Gθ,t := P[ht|θ]
the probability of the history ht, conditional on state θ. The optimal strategy is still a cut-oﬀ
strategy, with cut-oﬀ xt. Note that the function Gθ,  satisﬁes Gθ,0t = 1 and, for all t (ignoring
terms of order dt2 or higher)
Gθ,t+dt = Gθ,t ((Fθ (xt) + (1 − Pθ)(1 − Fθ (xt)))   (λdt) + 1   (1 − λdt)),






After the history ht, the cut-oﬀ xt must solve









Diﬀerentiating with respect to t and integrating by separation of variables yields equation







(P1 (1 − F1 (x)) − P0 (1 − F0 (x)))
−1 dx,
which implicitly deﬁnes xt, along with the initial condition x0 = l−1 (γ).
It turns out that this model has similar properties than the baseline model, because the cut-oﬀs
x and x share the same rate of convergence, as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 10. There exists α,β > 0 such that, for all t,
xt < xαt < xβt.
Therefore, the hidden failure model has the same qualitative behavior as the hidden action model.
Therefore, the probability of an eventual (and successful) investment is one if the state is good,
in both models, if signals are unbounded, and it is less than one otherwise. The comparison
between cut-oﬀs is in general ambiguous. Nevertheless, we have the following result.
Proposition 11. If p0 is low enough, and signals are suﬃciently bounded (l(1) < (1−P0)/(1−
P1)), the cut-oﬀ x is below the cut-oﬀ x, i.e., for all t,
xt ≥ xt.Biased Social Learning 26
If p0 is high enough and signals are unbounded, the inequality is reversed.
Therefore, when the prior is low enough and signals are suﬃciently bounded, and for any
time t, the probability that an investment occurs by time t is higher when failures are not
observable. Intuitively, assume we start from the same initial prior and observe “no news” in
both models. In the baseline model, this means simply that some pessimistic agents might have
arrived and chose not to invest, while in the hidden failure model, it might also be that some
optimistic agent might have invested and failed. Hence the more pronounced caution by agents,
and the lower threshold. Of course, this intuition is incomplete, since inferences do depend on
the threshold function itself. The increased caution of earlier agents mitigates the bad news
that a no-investment history conveys, making later agents relatively less cautious. This is why
additional conditions are required to ensure that these thresholds can be globally ranked.
7. Conclusions
At least as far as convergence is concerned, we have shown that relaxing the assumptions
that all types of decisions are observable does not change signiﬁcantly the asymptotic learning
properties of the model. Beliefs always converge and will converge to the true value for sure if and
only if private beliefs are unbounded. So, even if one action is hidden and can only be inferred,
the market aggregates the information correctly anyway when beliefs are unbounded.
With bounded signals, whichever model delivers a higher probability of investment depends on
a property of the signal distribution. If the hazard ratio is increasing in the signal, then invest-
ment is more likely in the model with biased learning, and welfare is lower. These conclusions
are reversed if the hazard ratio is decreasing. In the standard model, the property of increasing
hazard ratio precisely captures the condition ensuring that cascades cannot occur.
Those two results each raise their own set of questions. How little information does it take
to obtain complete learning with unbounded signals? Does the increasing hazard ratio property
always ensure that more information is better in social learning? It is particularly intriguing
that this property turns out to play a key role both in the comparison between both models, and
within the BHW model itself.Biased Social Learning 27
8. Appendix
8.1. Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since the public belief pt is a bounded martingale, the martingale con-
vergence theorem implies almost sure convergence to a value p∞ ∈ [0,1].










, as beliefs would
jump discretely after any investment, or would decrease to p otherwise. The threshold signal xt
must converge because it is a continuous function of the belief. It must converge to its boundaries
x∞ ∈ {0,1}, as the limit threshold cannot be any interior value x∞ ∈ (0,1): otherwise, a later
investment would almost surely occur, and the belief and the threshold would jump. The result
follows. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. In a history without any investment, the belief would converge to zero
and the threshold to one. We now show that with unbounded beliefs this is a zero probability
history, and conversely:
l(1) = +∞ ⇐⇒ lim
t
G1,t = 0.
Observe that the probability of no investment ever under state 1 converges, as it is an increasing
and bounded function. Since
F0 (xt) − F1 (xt) ≤ 1 − F1 (xt),















G1,t = 0 if l(1) = +∞.




λ(F0 (x) − F1 (x))Biased Social Learning 28
converges to 0, and, so for all x suﬃciently close to 1,
x
′
t = h(x) > −h
′ (1)(1 − xt) − M (1 − xt)
2 ,
with h′ (1) < 0 as h(x) > 0, for some M > 0. This implies that, for all t suﬃciently large,
1 − xt ≤
−h′ (1)
M + C1e−h′(1)t,
for some constant C1. Since
1 − F1 (xs) ≤ f1 (1)(1 − xs) + C2(1 − xs)
2 ,
and Z t −h′ (1)ds





/M < ln(C1 + M)/M,
it follows that G1,t is bounded below, so that
l(1) < +∞ ⇒ lim
t G1,t > 0.
￿
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume signals are unbounded. By Proposition 1, the public belief must
either converge to 0 or 1. Assume that the state is good. The belief cannot converge to 0, because
that would imply that the number of investments is ﬁnite, contradicting Proposition 2 (recall
that, after an investment, the public belief exceeds c).
If the state is bad, then the public belief converges to zero. By the martingale property, if the
belief converges to 1 in the good state it must converge to zero in the bad state, namely
pt = Et [p∞] = P∞ [θ = 1]pt + P∞ [θ = 0](1 − pt), and so P∞ [θ = 1] = 1 ⇒ P∞ [θ = 0] = 0.
Assume that signals are bounded. In the good state, beliefs can converge to the wrong value
p because there is a positive probability of a no investment history. In the bad state, beliefs
converge to (no less than) p with positive probability. Indeed, if they did not, then it would be
the case that p = 1 (by deﬁnition of p), and this is impossible with bounded beliefs. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. Let τ(x,t) denote the stopping time of a player arriving at instant t with
signal x, and let F(s;t,x), s ≥ t, denote the corresponding c.d.f. Fix an equilibrium and suppose
for the sake of contradiction that 0 < F(s;t,x) < 1 for some x,t and s > t, for some ﬁnite s. Let
qτ denote the private belief of this agent at time τ ≥ t, given his signal x and the equilibriumBiased Social Learning 29
strategies (conditional on the event Eτ that no one invested up to τ). Observe that qτ is non-
increasing, and constant over some interval of time [t′,t′′) if and only if F(t′′;s,x) = F(t′;s,x)
for all s ≤ t′ and x ∈ [0,1]. Assume that it is strictly proﬁtable to invest at time t with signal x.
Then, because the payoﬀ from investing is strictly increasing in qt, F(s;t,x) < 1 is only possible
if qs = qt, and player i assigns probability one to no one investing before (or at the same) time
than he does. In particular, any other player arriving in the interval of time (t,s) must invest
with probability zero in that interval of time. Consider the event that some player arrives in
this interval of time with a signal x ≥ xt, i.e. a player whose payoﬀ from investing immediately
is strictly positive. (xt here depends obviously upon the equilibrium strategies.) This event
has strictly positive probability, and thus, given the equilibrium strategies, there exists a player
arriving at some time t′ ∈ (t,s) whose probability of investing ﬁrst (after s) is strictly less than
1. This player would proﬁtably gain from investing immediately at time t′. Assume now that
it is strictly unproﬁtable to invest at time t with signal x. Plainly it remains unproﬁtable to
invest at any later time, and so it cannot be that 0 < F(s;t,x) for some ﬁnite s. Therefore, a
player is unwilling to delay unless x = xt, i.e. he is indiﬀerent between investing immediately
or never. This event has zero probability, and so does not aﬀect the analysis, in particular the
determination of xt. ￿









for all x ∈ [xk,xk+1], with equality for x = xk. That is, we have
F0(x) − F1(x)
1 − F0(x)
≤ ml(x) − 1,
which implies that the right-hand side is positive, as the left-hand side is.
Given Lemma 5, it is enough to show Bθ,∞ > Gθ,∞ for θ = 0. We have
∞ Y
k=0
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using that l(xk+1) =
F0(xk)




















but this is the case, since in fact both sides are equal by deﬁnition of m. By immediate inspection,
this chain of inequalities is tight if the hazard ratio is constant, and reversed if it is decreasing. ￿














(P1 (1 − F1) − P0 (1 − F0))
−1 dx,














1/P1 if l(1) = ∞,
1−l(1)
P0−P1l(1) if l(1) < ∞.
The result follows. ￿Biased Social Learning 31







−1 − (P1 (1 − F1) − P0 (1 − F0))
−1￿
dx > 0.
A suﬃcient condition for t < t′ is

























which requires signals to be bounded: l(1) < ∞.
Conversely, if l(1) = ∞, then there exists a ξ ∈ 0,1] such that
1 − F1 (ξ)





and we then have
x > ξ =⇒
1 − F1 (x)












−1 − (P1 (1 − F1) − P0 (1 − F0))
−1￿
dx < 0,
and the result follows. ￿Biased Social Learning 32




































































































































































F0 (x;a) = F1 (x;−a),
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After an investment, the threshold xτ+ decreases discontinuously (e.g. take a = 1)
l(xτ+) =
1 − F0 (xτ)












and the belief increases discontinuously to
pτ+ =
(exτ)pτ
(1 − pτ) + (exτ)pτ
> pτ.
8.3. Polynomial Example. Take the following c.d.f.
F1 = x
2, F0 = 1 − (1 − x)
2 .
In this example beliefs are unbounded, namely: l(x) ∈ [0,∞]. For λ = 1, c = 1/2 (=⇒













































(1 − F1 (xs))ds =
Z xt
0.5

















2xt −1 → 0,
and the probability that nobody invests in the bad state is
G0,t = e
1
2xt −1 → e
− 1
2 ≃ 61.Biased Social Learning 34
8.4. Hazard Function and Hazard Ratio. For θ belonging to any ordered state space, deﬁne





1 − Fθ (x)
,
θ > θ









Note that the properties of monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), the decreasing hazard





















Proof. The ﬁrst implication is trivial as IHRP is by deﬁnition the ﬁrst inequality and DHFP by






ln(1 − Fθ (x)) > 0.


















lθ,θ′ (z) − lθ,θ′ (x)
￿
dz > 0,
where the latter step is implied by MLRP. ￿Biased Social Learning 35
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